

Kyle L. Woodward

CONTACT INFORMATION	The University of North Carolina Department of Economics Gardner Hall 107, CB 3305 Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3305	+1 323 3 10 5 16 8 kyle.woodward@unc.edu https://kylewoodward.web.unc.edu/~klelandw/
EDUCATION	UCLA , Los Angeles, CA <i>Ph.D., Economics</i> <i>Advisor: Marek Pycia</i>	June 2015
	UCLA , Los Angeles, CA <i>Master of Arts, Economics</i>	June 2011
	Stanford University , Stanford, CA <i>Bachelor of Science, Mathematics</i> <i>Minors: Economics and Computer Science</i>	June 2006
WORKING PAPERS	Industry Costs and Research Aggregation in Dynamic Competition <i>With Greg Kubitz</i> Licensing Delays in Creedence Goods Markets Equilibrium with Monotone Actions On Nonmonotone Equilibria with Biased Sampling Equilibrium Uniqueness in Uniform-Price Auctions: Implications for Low-Revenue Outcomes Random Payments in Divisible-Good Auctions Uniform-Price Auctions with a Last Accepted Bid Pricing Rule Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Auctions Pay-as-Bid: Selling Divisible Goods to Uninformed Bidders <i>With Marek Pycia</i>	
PRESENTATIONS	Oxford University , Oxford, U.K. <i>Uniform-Price Auctions with a Last Accepted Bid Pricing Rule</i>	May, 2017
	University of Rochester , Rochester, NY <i>Equilibrium with Monotone Actions</i>	April, 2017
	Collegio Carlo Alberto , Torino, Italy <i>Uniform-Price Auctions with a Last Accepted Bid Pricing Rule</i>	March, 2017
	University of Zurich , Zürich, Switzerland <i>Industry Costs and Research Aggregation in Dynamic Competition</i>	March, 2017
	Southern Economic Association , Tampa, FL <i>Uniform-Price Auctions with a Last Accepted Bid Pricing Rule</i>	November, 2017

	Columbia/Duke/Northwestern/MIT Theory , Durham, NC <i>Uniform-Price Auctions with a Last Accepted Bid Pricing Rule</i>	November, 2017
	INFORMS , Houston, TX <i>Auctions and Other Games with Max-Min Players</i>	October, 2017
	North American Summer Meeting , St. Louis, MO <i>Equilibrium and Approximation in Auction-Like Models</i>	June, 2017
	MWET , Lexington, KY <i>Equilibrium and Approximation in Auction-Like Models</i>	May, 2017
	ZWABT , Zürich, Switzerland <i>Auctions and Other Games with Max-Min Players</i>	March, 2017
	Paris School of Economics , Paris, France <i>Equilibrium and Approximation in Auction-Like Models</i>	March, 2017
	INFORMS , Nashville, TN <i>Equilibrium and Approximation in Auction-Like Models</i>	November, 2016
	NC State University , Raleigh, NC <i>Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Auction-Like Games</i>	October, 2016
	EC'16 , Maastricht, Netherlands <i>Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Auctions: Equilibrium Existence with Private Information</i>	July, 2016
	EC'16 , Maastricht, Netherlands <i>Pay-as-Bid: Selling Divisible Goods</i>	July, 2016
	SAET , Rio de Janeiro, Brazil <i>Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Auctions: Equilibrium Existence with Private Information</i>	July, 2016
	ISMP 2015 , Pittsburgh, PA <i>Pay-as-Bid: Selling Divisible Goods to Uninformed Bidders</i>	July, 2015
	UNC-Chapel Hill , Chapel Hill, NC <i>Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Auctions</i>	February, 2015
	Northwestern University , Evanston, IL <i>Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Auctions</i>	January, 2015
	XVII Southwest Economic Theory Conference , Tucson, AZ <i>Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Auctions</i>	March 2015
	XVI Southwest Economic Theory Conference , Irvine, CA <i>Pay-as-Bid: Selling Divisible Goods to Uninformed Bidders</i>	March 2014
HONORS	Dissertation Year Fellowship , UCLA	June 2014
	Graduate Economics Association Service Award , UCLA	May 2014
	Economics Teaching Assistant Award , UCLA	October 2013

TEACHING

UNC Econ 890: Quantitative Techniques II <i>Ratings: mean 3.90/5, median 5.00/5</i>	Fall 2017
UNC Econ 510: Advanced Microeconomic Theory	Fall 2017
UNC Econ 510: Advanced Microeconomic Theory <i>Ratings: mean 4.70/5, median 5.00/5</i>	Spring 2017
UNC Econ 890: Quantitative Techniques II	Fall 2016
UNC Econ 890: Quantitative Techniques II	Fall 2015
UNC Econ 510: Advanced Microeconomic Theory <i>Ratings: mean 4.13/5, median 4.50/5</i>	Fall 2015
UCLA Econ 495: Teaching College Economics, Kathleen McGarry	AY13-14
UCLA Econ 97: Economic Toolkit	Summer 2013
UCLA Econ 106D: Designed Markets, Marek Pycia <i>Ratings: mean 8.82/9, median 9.00/9</i>	Spring 2013
UCLA Econ 41: Statistics for Economists, Rosa Matzkin <i>Ratings: mean 8.60/9, median 9.00/9</i>	Winter 2013
UCLA Econ 101: Microeconomic Theory, Jernej Čopič <i>Ratings: mean 8.65/9, median 9.00/9</i>	Fall 2012
GGBW: Introduction to Game Theory	Summer 2012
UCLA Econ 11: Microeconomic Theory, Bill Zame <i>Ratings: mean 8.67/9, median 9.00/9</i>	Spring 2012
UCLA Econ 41: Statistics for Economists, Maximilian Kasy <i>Ratings: mean 8.51/9, median 9.00/9</i>	Winter 2012
UCLA Econ 201A: Theory of the Firm and Consumer, Bill Zame <i>Ratings: mean 8.56/9, median 9.00/9</i>	Fall 2011
UCLA Econ M134: Environmental Economics, Matt Kahn	Summer 2011
GGBW: Introduction to Game Theory	Summer 2011
UCLA Econ 201C: Equilibrium and Welfare, John Riley and Joe Ostroy <i>Ratings: mean 8.37/9, median 9.00/9</i>	Spring 2011
UCLA Econ 101: Microeconomic Theory, Bill Zame <i>Ratings: mean 8.23/9, median 9.00/9</i>	Winter 2011
UCLA Econ 41: Statistics for Economists, Kata Bognar <i>Ratings: mean 8.27/9, median 9.00/9</i>	Fall 2010
(MS)² CS: Introduction to Computer Science	Summer 2005

REFEREEING

<i>Dynamic Games and Applications</i>	<i>International Economic Review</i>
EC'16	<i>International Journal of Game Theory</i>
<i>Econometrica</i>	<i>Journal of Economic Theory</i>
<i>Economics Letters</i>	<i>RAND Journal of Economics</i>
<i>Electronic Commerce Research</i>	<i>Review of Economic Studies</i>
<i>IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control</i>	<i>Theoretical Economics</i>

SERVICE

UNC Economics Placement Committee
Co-director

August 2015 – August 2017

UCLA Social Sciences Council
Representative

June 2011 – November 2013

UCLA Graduate Economics Association
Commissar

June 2011 – April 2013

UCLA Graduate Economics Association
Vice President

September 2010 – June 2011